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Abstract
Using an endogenous growth model with physical and human capital accumulation,
this paper considers the sustainability of economic growth when the use of a pollut-
ing input (e.g., fossil fuels) intensies the risk of capital destruction through natural
disasters. We nd that growth is sustainable only if the tax rate on the polluting
input increases over time. The long-term rate of economic growth follows an inverted
V-shaped curve relative to the growth rate of the environmental tax, and it is max-
imized by the least aggressive tax policy of those that asymptotically eliminate the
use of polluting inputs. Unavailability of insurance can accelerate or decelerate the
growth-maximizing speed of the tax increase depending on the relative signicance of
the risk premium and precautionary savings eects. Welfare is maximized under a
milder environmental tax policy, especially when the pollutants accumulate gradually.
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Figure 1: Economic Damage from Natural Disasters Worldwide (in billions of 2005 US
dollars). The dashed line indicates the sum of damage from storms, droughts, extreme temperatures,
oods, mass movements because of climate change, and wildres. Source: Damage estimates in current
US dollars are from EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database, CRED, the Universite Catholique de
Louvain. Present value estimates in 2005 US dollars are calculated using the implicit GDP price deator
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1 Introduction
Natural disasters have a substantial impact on the economy, primarily through the de-
struction of capital stock. For example, Burton and Hicks (2005) estimated that Hurricane
Katrina in August 2005 generated commercial structure damage of $21 billion, commercial
equipment damage of $36 billion, and residential structure and content damage of almost
$75 billion. These are not negligible values, even relative to the entire U.S. physical capital
stock.1 CRED (2012) reported that the oods in Thailand from August to December 2011
caused US$40 billion in economic damage, which is more than 12% of the nation's GDP.
Figure 1 depicts the time series of the total economic damage caused by natural disasters
throughout the world. Although the magnitude of damage caused by Hurricane Katrina
1In another study of the estimated costs of Hurricane Katrina, King (2005) reported that total economic
losses, including insured and uninsured property and ood damage, were expected to exceed $200 billion.
See Gaddis et al. (2007) for the full cost estimates.
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may not appear typical, the gure clearly shows a steady and signicant upward trend in
economic damage arising from natural disasters.
One obvious reason behind this upward trend is the expansion of the world economy.
As the world economy expands, it accumulates more capital, which means that it has more
to lose from a natural disaster of a given physical intensity. However, this simple account
cannot fully explain the overall growing trend in damages. To see this, we plot the ratio of
the damage from natural disasters to world GDP in Figure 2. As shown, this ratio has been
increasing since 1960. On this basis, the gure suggests that each unit of installed capital
is facing an increasingly higher risk of damage and loss from natural disasters over time.
This observation may then have serious implications for the sustainability of economic
growth. Also, observe from Figures 1 and 2 that most economic damage is caused by
weather-related disasters. Accordingly, if economic activity is to some extent responsible
for climate change, and if climate change aects the intensity and frequency of weather-
related disasters,2 economic growth itself poses a threat to capital accumulation and the
sustainability of future growth.
This paper theoretically examines the long-term consequences of the risk of natural
disasters on economic growth in a setting where economic activity itself can intensify the
risk of natural disasters. We introduce polluting inputs, such as fossil fuels, into a Uzawa{
Lucas type endogenous growth model, and assume that the use of polluting inputs raises
the probability that capital stocks are destroyed by natural disasters. In the model, we
show that as long as the cost of using polluting inputs is constant, economic growth is
not sustainable because the risk of natural disasters eventually rises to the point at which
2There is an ongoing scientic debate about the extent to which natural disasters and global warming
relate to human activity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report
(IPCC 2007, p.6) notes, \Anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has likely had a discernible
inuence at the global scale on observed changes in many physical and biological systems." Emanuel (2005)
found that the destructiveness of tropical cyclones is highly correlated with tropical sea surface temperature
and predicted a substantial increase in hurricane-related losses in the future. Min et al. (2011) provided
evidence that human-induced increases in greenhouse gases have contributed to the observed intensication
of heavy precipitation events. There are also other explanations; e.g., Pielke et al. (2008) suggested that
the increasing density of the population and property in coastal areas accounts for the trend of increasing
hurricane damage in the U.S. We simply assume causality between the emission of greenhouse gases and the
frequency of natural disasters. Scientic examination of the validity of this causality is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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Figure 2: Ratio of Damage from Natural Disasters to World GDP (percent). Data source:
World GDP (in current US dollars) is from World Development Indicators, World Bank Data Group.
agents do not want to invest in capital any further.
Given this result, we introduce a time-varying environmental tax on polluting input,
which is shown to have both positive and negative eects on economic growth. On one
hand, the faster the environmental tax rate increases, the lower the asymptotic amount
of pollution and, therefore, the lower the probability of disasters. This gives households
a greater incentive to save, which promotes growth.3 On the other hand, the increased
cost of using the polluting input by private rms reduces their (eective) productivity
at each point in time, and this has a negative eect on growth. This paper shows that
these opposing eects give rise to a non-monotonic relationship between the long-term
rate of economic growth and the speed with which the environmental tax increases. We
characterize the policy that maximizes the long-term growth rate and examine how it
diers from the welfare-maximizing policy. We also examine how the market equilibrium
and the optimal policy are aected by the way in which pollutants accumulate and by the
extent to which disaster damages can be insured.
3In endogenous growth models of the Lucas (1988) type, increased savings and investments (which
include the opportunity cost of education) promote growth primarily through faster human capital accu-
mulation. This result depends on the assumption that the marginal productivity of human capital in the
education sector is constant.
3
Relationship to the literature
The literature on the link between natural disasters and economic growth is relatively new.
However, an increasing amount of work investigates both the theoretical and empirical re-
lations between these events. There are mixed empirical results regarding whether natural
disasters inhibit or promote growth. Empirical studies that use short-run data tend to
nd adverse eects of natural disasters on growth. Raddatz (2007) considered a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model for low-income countries with various external shocks, includ-
ing climatic disasters, and his estimates showed that climatic and humanitarian disasters
result in declines in real per capita GDP of 2% and 4%, respectively. Using panel data
for 109 countries, Noy (2009) found that more signicant natural disasters in terms of
direct damage to the capital stock lead to more pronounced slowdowns in production. In
contrast, using cross-sectional data over a longer period of 1960{90, Skidmore and Toya
(2002) found a positive correlation between the frequency of disasters and average growth
rates. Although there is no general agreement on the overall eect of natural disasters on
growth, the estimation performed by Skidmore and Toya (2002) suggested that the higher
frequency of climatic disasters leads to a substitution from physical capital investment to-
ward human capital. Consistent with this nding, our model shows that under appropriate
environmental policies, agents accumulate human capital stock much faster than output
and physical capital, enabling sustained growth with limited use of the polluting input.
The theoretical literature is still in its infancy.4 For instance, Soretz (2007) explicitly
introduced the risk of disasters into an AK-type one-sector stochastic endogenous growth
model and considered optimal pollution taxation. Hallegatte and Dumas (2009) considered
a vintage capital model and showed that under plausible parameter ranges, disasters never
promote economic growth through the accelerated replacement of old capital. Lastly,
using numerical simulations, Narita, Tol, and Antho (2009) quantitatively calculated the
direct economic impact of tropical cyclones. Our analysis complements these studies by
considering both human and physical capital accumulation in addition to the polluting
4Although not directly concerned with disasters, some previous studies have analytically examined the
eect of environmental quality on economic growth. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) and Groth and Schou
(2007), for example, considered models where environmental quality aects productivity. Alternatively,
Forster (1973), Gradus and Smulders (1993), John and Pecchenino (1994), Stokey (1998), and Hartman
and Kwon (2005) introduced the disutility of pollution into endogenous growth models.
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input. This is an important extension, not only because the substitution to human capital
accumulation in the presence of disaster risk is empirically supported, but also because
theoretically it is the key to sustained and desirable growth.5 In addition, our methodology
can analytically clarify the mutual causality between economic growth and the risk of
natural disasters and how this relationship can be altered by environmental tax policy.6
Rather than merely considering the optimal tax policy, we consider arbitrary dynamic tax
policies and nd both welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After presenting the baseline model
in Section 2, Section 3 shows that in market equilibrium, growth cannot be sustained if
the cost of (tax on) the polluting input is constant. We then derive the (asymptotically)
balanced growth equilibrium path under a time-varying environmental tax in Section 4.
The welfare analysis is in Section 5. Section 6 considers an extension of the model in
which pollution accumulates gradually. Section 7 examines the case where the idiosyncratic
risks to human capital cannot be insured. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains
mathematical proofs and derivations.
2 The Baseline Model
Consider an Uzawa{Lucas growth model where the economy is populated by a unit mass
of innitely lived households i 2 [0; 1] holding human capital hit and savings in the form of
nancial assets, sit.
7 Production is performed by a unit mass of competitive rms j 2 [0; 1]
with a homogenous production technology. One dierence between our model and that of
Lucas (1988) is that production at rm j requires not only physical capital kjt and human
capital njt, but also a polluting input pjt, such as fossil fuels that emit pollutants and
5Using a growth model with pollution and physical capital, Stokey (1998) showed that sustained growth
is not desirable even when it is technically feasible. However, Hartman and Kwon (2005) found that Stokey's
(1998) result is overturned when human capital is introduced.
6Narita, Tol, and Antho (2009) assume that the savings rate is exogenous, while in our model it reacts
endogenously to the risk of disasters. In Hallegatte and Dumas (2009), the long-term rate of growth is
ultimately determined by the exogenous growth in total factor productivity (TFP), while in our model it
is determined by endogenous human and physical accumulation.
7For compact notation, we employ subscript t rather than (t), even though time is continuous. We also
omit 0 and 1 from the integrals
R 1
0
: : : di and
R 1
0
: : : dj when they are obvious.
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greenhouse gases. Specically, the output of rm j is
yjt = Ak

jtn
1  
jt p

jt; (1)
where A is a productivity parameter of the production sector,  2 (0; 1) represents the
share of physical capital, and  2 (0; 1  ) is the share of the polluting input. All output
is either consumed or added to the physical capital stock.
For simplicity, we consider neither resource limits nor extraction and/or production
costs of the polluting input pjt.
8 Rather, we focus on the possibility that the aggregate
use of the polluting input Pt 
R
pjtdj increases the risk of natural disasters. Suppose that
the economy consists of a continuum of small local areas, and both rms and households
are dispersed across areas. In each area, natural disasters occur in a Poisson process.
In this baseline model, we consider the simplest scenario where the use of the polluting
input immediately increases the arrival rate per unit of time (the Poisson probability) such
that qt = q + q^Pt, where q and q^ are positive constants. We will relax this assumption
and consider accumulating pollution in Section 6. When a natural disaster occurs in
an area, it causes damage to both physical and human capital. Specically, it destroys
a fraction Kjt 2 (0; 1) of the physical capital stock installed to rms j located in that
area and a fraction it 2 (0; 1) of the human capital stock owned by households i in the
area. The damage ratios Kjt and it are stochastic variables that are randomly drawn
from the distribution functions (Kjt) and 	(it), respectively. Both the occurrence and
the damage ratios of natural disasters are assumed to be idiosyncratic across time and
location.9 Then, by the law of large numbers, the total damages to aggregate physical
8Although we ignore the niteness of polluting inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), sustainability of growth under
nonrenewable resources has been examined by, for example, Grimaud and Rouge (2003), Tsur and Zemel
(2005), and Groth and Schou (2007). Elasson and Turnovsky (2005) examined the growth dynamics with
a resource that recovers only gradually. We also ignore extraction costs in our model because they would
become increasingly small relative to the social marginal cost of pollution: section 5 will show that the
social marginal cost of Pt (i.e., the expected marginal damage) increases exponentially in the long run.
9For simplicity of the analysis, we ignore the short-term uctuations caused by large-scale (not id-
iosyncratic) disasters. In reality, the short-term uctuations in investment and savings are not necessarily
averaged out and may aect the long-term growth (see, for example, Hallegatte et al. 2007). In addition, as
suggested by Denuit et al. (2011), the aggregate environmental risk also aects the optimal (social planner's)
saving rate.
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capital stock Kt 
R
kjtdj and aggregate human capital stock Ht 
R
hitdi are written as:Z
qt
K
jtkjtdj =
(q + q^Pt)Kt; (2)Z
qtithitdi =  (q + q^Pt)Ht; (3)
where  and  represent the expected values of distributions (Kjt) and 	(it), respectively.
Let us state the resource constraint of the economy. Because we consider a closed
economy where all savings are used as physical capital in the production sector,
R
sitdi =R
kjtdj  Kt holds. In contrast, human capital can be used for either production or
education, and we denote by ut  Nt=Ht 2 [0; 1] the aggregate fraction of human capital
devoted to production, where Nt 
R
njtdj. To keep our model tractable, we ignore
adjustment costs after a rm is hit by a disaster and assume that reallocation of physical
capital across areas occurs instantly.10 Because the production function (1) has constant
returns to scale, this assumption implies that the rms have the same factor input ratios
(both in market equilibrium and in the social planner's problem), so their amounts of
production can be aggregated as Yt 
R
yjtdj = AK

t (utHt)
1  P t . The remaining
human capital stock (1   ut)Ht is used in the education sector to produce B(1   ut)Ht
units of additional human capital, where B is a productivity parameter of the education
sector. Let constants K and H denote the depreciation rates for physical and human
capital stock, respectively, and dene K  K + q,   q^, H  H +  q, and    q^.
Then, using (2) and (3), the resource constraints for the physical and human capital stocks
can be summarized as:
_Kt = Yt   Ct   (K + Pt)Kt; Yt = AKt (utHt)1  P t ; (4)
_Ht = B(1  ut)Ht   (H +  Pt)Ht; (5)
where Ct 
R
citdi represents the aggregate consumption of households. Equations (4) and
(5) are very similar to Lucas (1988) except that the use of polluting input Pt in production
eectively augments the depreciation rates of physical and human capital stocks.11
10Although we ignore the adjustment process, a number of studies have explicitly examined the cost
of adjustment after a natural disaster. In a non-equilibrium dynamic model, Hallegatte et al. (2007)
showed quantitatively that extreme events can entail much larger production losses than those analyzed in
neoclassical growth models. In contrast, Rose (2004) has shown that the damage can be mitigated if agents
take resilient (preventive or adaptive) actions in a computable general equilibrium model.
11In this respect, our model is closely related to that of Gradus and Smulders (1993, Section 4), who
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Unlike standard endogenous growth models, the right-hand sides of Equations (4) and
(5) are not homogenous of degree one in terms of quantities. Although the production
function has constant returns to scale, the homothetic expansion of all of inputs (Kt, Ht
and Pt) would result in increasingly frequent destruction of capital stocks. The following
section will show that, without appropriate environmental policies, the intensication of
natural disasters eventually makes further accumulation of capital impossible.
3 Market Economy
3.1 Environmental tax and behavior of rms
We start the analysis with the market economy, where markets are perfectly competitive
but the government levies a per-unit tax of t on the use of polluting inputs pjt by rms
(the numeraire is the nal goods). Because we ignore the extraction cost and rms take the
risk of natural disasters as given, the only private cost of using pjt is t. At the beginning of
the economy, the government announces the tax rate t for all t, and it is assumed that the
government can commit to this tax policy. The tax revenue Tt = tPt is then distributed
to consumers as a uniform transfer.
At each point in time, every rm j in the production sector chooses the employment of
kjt and njt and the amount of pjt to maximize the expected prot by taking as given the
interest rate rt, the wage rate wt, and t. Similarly to (4), the sum of the depreciation and
the expected natural disaster damage to rm j's physical capital is ( + Pt)kjt. Then,
using the production function (1), the problem of rm j can be expressed as
max
kjt;njt;pjt
Akjtn
1  
jt p

jt   (rt + K + Pt)kjt   wtnjt   tpjt:
extended Lucas (1988) to include air pollution, which causes human capital to depreciate at a faster rate
through health problems. Aside from the dierence in the focus, a notable distinction is that pollution can
be abated by devoting goods in their model, whereas we consider Pt as a necessary input for production.
They focused on the social planner's problem, whereas this paper examines a wider range of environmental
tax policies.
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The rst-order conditions are12
rt = 
yjt
kjt
  K   Pt; wt = (1    ) yjt
njt
; t = 
yjt
pjt
:
Because the above conditions are the same for all rms, we can replace yjt=kjt, yjt=njt and
yjt=pjt by their aggregate counterparts, yielding the aggregate use of the polluting input
and factor prices as
Pt = Yt=t; (6)
rt = Yt=Kt   K   Pt; wt = (1    )Yt=Nt: (7)
Equation (6) shows that the environmental tax lowers the aggregate level of pollution.
However, substituting this condition into the production function implies
Yt =

~A
  
1 

K^t N
1 ^
t ; (8)
where ~A  =(1 )A1=(1 ) and ^  =(1   ): Equation (8) claries that the environ-
mental tax lowers the eective TFP, ~A =(1 ).
The education sector has a representative competitive rm. It uses only human capital
and has a linear production technology, where B(1 ut)Ht units of additional human capital
are produced by employing (1  ut)Ht units of human capital. Under perfect competition,
the price of one additional unit of human capital is determined by its marginal cost wt=B.
3.2 Behavior of households
Every household i aims to maximize its expected utility:
E
"Z 1
0
c1 it   1
1   e
 tdt
#
; (9)
where we assume that relative risk aversion  is higher than 1 and that the rate of time
preference satises  < B   H so that households have sucient incentive to invest in
human capital.
12When these conditions are satised, the maximized expected prot is zero because the maximand in
the problem is homogeneous of degree one with respect to production factors. In equilibrium, the aggregate
prot will become zero because disaster damages are idiosyncratic.
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At normal times, i.e., except at the moment the household is hit by a disaster, its
savings and human capital evolve as
_sit = rtsit + wthit   (wt=B)mit   cit + Tt; (10)
_hit = mit   Hhit; (11)
where mit is the purchase of additional human capital through the education sector at
the unit price of wt=B. One may also interpret mit as including additions to own human
capital through self or home training, in which case the opportunity cost of training (and
not working) is wt=B. Tt in (10) represents the amount of uniform transfer that each
household receives. Because the total measure of households is unity, it is the same as the
total revenue from environmental tax: Tt = tPt.
It is convenient to express the budget constraint in terms of the total assets of household
i, dened by ait  sit + (wt=B)hit. Dierentiating this denition with respect to time and
then applying (10) and (11), we obtain
_ait
ait
= (1  it)rt + it

B   H + _wt
wt

  cit
ait
+
Tt
ait
; (12)
where it is the fraction of human capital in the total assets, dened as
it  (wt=B)hit
sit + (wt=B)hit
=
wthit
Bsit + wthit
: (13)
When a household is hit by a disaster, its human capital shrinks from hit to ~hit =
(1  it)hit, where it is randomly drawn from distribution 	(it). The savings sit are not
signicantly aected because they are invested in locationally dispersed rms. Thus, the
total assets ait  sit + (wt=B)hit jump to
~ait = (1  itit)ait; with Poisson probability qt = q + q^Pt. (14)
Because the households are risk averse, it would be optimal to insure against the possible
loss of ititait if such insurance is available. For the time being, we consider the case
where such insurance is available with no transaction cost, and hence all households take
out perfect insurance. The case without insurance will be analyzed in Section 7. The
ow premium for this insurance is equal to the expected loss: (q + q^Pt)E[ititait] =
(q+ q^Pt)it  ait. Subtracting this premium from the budget constraint (12), we obtain the
budget constraint under perfect insurance, which holds for all t:
_ait
ait
= (1  it)rt + it

B   H    Pt + _wt
wt

  cit
ait
+
Tt
ait
; (15)
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where H  H +  q and    q^ as in (5).
Given the time paths of rt, wt and Pt, each household chooses the path of consumption
cit and asset allocation it to maximize (9) subject to the budget constraint (15). The right-
hand side (RHS) of the budget constraint (15) is linear in it. This linearity implies that
households are willing to hold both savings (which will then be used as physical capital)
and human capital only if the following arbitrage condition is satised:
B   H    Pt + _wt
wt
= rt: (16)
On the LHS of (16), B   H    Pt is the rate at which human capital is reproduced,
and _wt=wt is the capital gain (or loss if negative) in holding human capital when its value
wt=B changes. The sum of these must coincide with the interest rate rt. Otherwise, all
households would invest only in one type of capital stock, which would raise the value of
the other type of capital due to scarcity, contradicting the decision of households not to
invest in it.
Using the arbitrage condition (16), the budget constraint (15) reduces to a familiar form:
_ait = rtait  cit+ Tt. The optimal solution to this problem is characterized by the Keynes-
Ramsey Rule  ( _cit=cit) =   rt and the transversality condition limt!1 aitc it e t = 0.
3.3 Market equilibrium and sustainability of growth
Given the initial levels of K0 and H0 and the time path of t, the aggregate variables in
market equilibrium, Kt, Ht, Pt, ut and Ct, are determined as follows. The dynamics for
Kt and Ht are given by resource constraints (4) and (5).
13 Aggregate pollution Pt is given
by (6). Substituting the time derivative of (7) into the arbitrage condition (16) gives the
condition for the fraction of human capital devoted to production ut( Nt=Ht):
_Yt
Yt
 
_Ht
Ht
  _ut
ut
=


Yt
Kt
  K   Pt

  (B   H    Pt) : (17)
13We can conrm that aggregating the budget constraint (15) and then eliminating factor prices and
Tt = tPt by (6) and (7) yields a weighted sum of resource constraints (4) and (5). Although each household
is indierent to the asset allocation it under (16), in aggregate it's are determined to satisfy the equilibrium
of the factor market,
R
(1  it)aitdi 
R
sitdi = Kt and (B=wt)
R
itaitdi 
R
hitdi = Ht.
11
Finally, aggregating the Keynes{Ramsey Rule and the transversality condition for all
households gives the dynamics for aggregate consumption Ct:
_Ct
Ct
=
1



Yt
Kt
  K   Pt

  

; (18)
lim
t!1KtC
 
t e
 t = 0; lim
t!1(wt=B)HtC
 
t e
 t = 0; (19)
where we used
R
aitdi =
R
(sit + (wt=B)hit)di = Kt + (wt=B)Ht. The market equilibrium
is characterized by (4), (5), (6), (17), (18), and the transversality conditions (19).
Let us examine the long-run property of the market equilibrium in the simplest case,
where the government sets a constant per-unit tax rate 0 on pjt. From equation (6),
pollution increases in proportion to output Yt under this policy. Given that the increasing
use of the polluting input makes natural disasters increasingly frequent, it appears that
economic growth is not sustainable under such a static environmental policy. The following
proposition formally shows that this insight is correct.
Proposition 1 If the per-unit tax on the polluting input is constant (t = 0 for all t),
then economic growth is not sustainable in the sense that aggregate consumption cannot
grow in the long run.
Proof: The proof goes via reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that consumption grows in
the long run (i.e., limt!1 _Ct=Ct > 0). Using (6), the Keynes{Ramsey Rule (18) can be
rewritten as:
_Ct
Ct
=  + K

+
1


  
0
Kt

Yt
Kt
: (20)
For the RHS to be positive, the sign of the value in the parentheses on the RHS must be
positive. Hence, in the long run, physical capital Kt must be bounded above by a constant
value at 0=. Note that, when t is constant, dierentiating (8) with respect to time
gives _Yt=Yt = ^ _Kt=Kt + (1   ^) _Nt=Nt. Using this and (18), the arbitrage condition (17)
can be written as the following:
_Nt
Nt
=
_Kt
Kt
  
^
_Ct
Ct
+
1
^
(B   H    Pt   ) : (21)
In the long run, the rst term on the RHS is less than 0 because Kt is bounded. The second
term is negative because we assumed consumption growth. The third term is also negative
because consumption growth requires output growth, which implies Pt = Yt=t ! 1
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under the constant tax rate. Therefore, _Nt=Nt is negative in the long run, implying that
the human capital eventually shrinks. Given the boundedness of Kt and Nt, (8) means
that production cannot grow in the long run. This result clearly contradicts the initial
assumption that consumption grows in the long run. 
Intuitively, the proof of the proposition explains that there is a barrier to capital accu-
mulation under a constant environmental tax rate. As long as rms face a constant tax rate
on the polluting input, the risk of disasters rises proportionally with output (see Equation
6). The rise in the expected damage to physical capital discourages rms from employing
physical capital, which lowers the equilibrium interest rate in (7). Eventually rt falls to
, at which point agents no longer want to save more. A higher environmental tax will
expand this limit because the upper bound for Kt, i.e., 0=, is increasing in 0.
14 Still,
as long as the tax rate is constant, economic growth cannot be sustained forever. This
result suggests that, to sustain economic growth, it is necessary to increase the rate of the
environmental tax over time to prevent the risk of disasters from increasing excessively. In
the remainder of the paper, we consider such a time-varying tax policy.
4 Asymptotically Balanced Growth Paths
In existing studies of endogenous growth, it is common to focus only on balanced growth
paths (BGP), where the growth rates of all variables are constant for all t. However, in
our model, the risk of capital destruction makes the system of the economy inevitably
nonhomothetic, implying that any BGP may not exist. Following Palivos et al. (1997), we
overcome this problem by considering a broader family of equilibrium paths that asymptote
to a BGP only in the long run:
Denition 1 (NABGP) An equilibrium path is said to be an asymptotically BGP if the
growth rates of output, inputs, and consumption converge to nite constant values; that
is, if g  limt!1 _Yt=Yt, gK  limt!1 _Kt=Kt, gH  limt!1 _Ht=Ht, gu  limt!1 _ut=ut,
gP  limt!1 _Pt=Pt, and gC  limt!1 _Ct=Ct are well dened and nite. In addition, if
14In contrast, if rms can use the polluting input almost freely (0 ! 0), the proof of Proposition 1
suggests that Kt and Ht will inevitably fall to zero. Even though using a massive amount of Pt might
increase the output initially, the destruction of capital will overwhelm the production and collapse the
economy.
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gC  0, it is said to be a nondegenerate, asymptotically balanced growth path (NABGP).15
In this section, we seek to identify a tax policy that achieves positive long-run growth
within the family of asymptotically BGP, referred to as a NABGP. From denition 1
and Equation (6), the asymptotic growth rate of the tax rate, which we denote by g 
limt!1 _t=t, must also be well dened on any NABGP. The main task of this section is
to examine the dependence of the long-term rate of economic growth g on the speed of
increase of the environmental tax rate, g . We rst show that production cannot grow
faster than the environmental tax rate:
Lemma 1 On any NABGP, g  g .
Proof: in Appendix A.1.
Intuitively, if production grew faster than the tax rate, the use of the polluting input
Pt = Yt=t would increase without bound, and natural disasters would be increasingly
frequent. In such a situation, however, both physical and human capital deteriorate at
an accelerating rate, contradicting the initial assumption that output can grow. One
implication from Lemma 1 is that sustained growth (with g > 0) is possible only when
g > 0; i.e., only when the per-unit tax rate increases at an asymptotically constant rate.
Another implication of g  g is that Pt is not increasing with time in the long run
(gP  limt!1 _Pt=Pt  0 from Equation 6). Given that the amount of polluting input
Pt is nonnegative, this means that Pt converges to a constant value in the long run. We
denote this asymptotic value by P   limt!1 Pt. In particular, if g < g , Pt falls with
time (gP < 0) and necessarily converges to P
 = 0. Even though we limit our attention to
nondegenerate growth paths, we should not rule out this possibility. It is true that output
Yt is zero if Pt = 0 given the Cobb{Douglas production technology (1), where polluting
inputs, such as fossil fuels, are necessary. However, in NABGPs where Pt asymptotes to
P , Pt does not necessarily coincide with P  = 0 at any date. Furthermore, limt!1 Pt = 0
does not necessarily mean limt!1 Yt = 0 as the other production factors in (1), namely Kt
and Ht, may be accumulated unboundedly.
15Palivos et al. (1997) call an asymptotically BGP nondegenerate when every production input grows
at a positive rate. Our denition of nondegeneration is weaker (broader) as we only require aggregate
consumption not to fall. We will show that gP can be negative in a NABGP.
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Given the asymptotic constancy of Pt, the rst-order and transversality conditions
require ut, zt  Yt=Kt, and t  Ct=Kt to be asymptotically constant, which implies
gu = 0; gK = gC = g
; (22)
as formally conrmed in Appendix A.2. Although condition (22) means that physical capi-
tal and consumption grow in parallel with output, the growth rate of human capital cannot
be the same as that of output. Dierentiating the production function (8) logarithmically
with respect to time gives g =   1  g+^gK+(1 ^)(gu+gH); where we used Nt = utHt.
To be consistent with condition (22), gH should satisfy
gH = g
 +

1     g : (23)
Equation (23) says that on any NABGP, human capital must accumulate faster than
physical capital and output, and the dierence is larger when the growth rate of the envi-
ronmental tax is higher. To see why agents are willing to accumulate human capital more
quickly in equilibrium, observe that as the tax rate on the polluting input increases over
time, the eective productivity of private rms ~A =(1 ) gradually falls, as shown in (8).
This means that if human capital were accumulated at the same speed as physical capital,
output would only be able to grow slower than the speed of physical capital accumulation,
and the marginal productivity of physical capital, Yt=Kt, would fall. In this manner,
raising the tax rate on the polluting input hinders physical capital investment, and conse-
quently induces agents to choose human capital investment an alternate means of saving,
as documented by Skidmore and Toya (2002).16
16Nonetheless, the marginal productivity of capital is kept constant on the NABGP. This is because as
human capital becomes increasingly abundant relative to physical capital, it raises the marginal productivity
of physical capital and eventually compensates for the decline in eective productivity.
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Now we are ready to summarize the conditions that must be satised on any NABGP.
Substituting (22) and (23) for equilibrium conditions (4), (5), (6), (17), and (18) gives
Evolution of Kt: g
 = z      (K + P ); (24)
Evolution of Ht: g
 +

1     g = B(1  u
)  (H +  P ); (25)
Arbitrage condition:   
1     g = (z
   K   Pt)  (B   H    P ) ; (26)
Keynes{Ramsey rule: g = (z   K   P )  ; (27)
Asymptotic pollution: either
8><>: P
  0 and g = g , (Case 1)
P  = 0 and g < g , (Case 2)
(28)
where u  limt!1 ut 2 [0; 1], z  limt!1 Yt=Kt  0, and   limt!1Ct=Kt  0.
Given the tax policy g  0, which is set by the government, the ve conditions (24)-(28)
determine ve unknowns (g, z, , u, P ) on the NABGP.
This problem can be solved as a system of linear equations once we determine which of
the two cases in the complementary slackness condition (28) applies. To determine whether
Case 1 applies under a given tax policy g , we solve (24)-(27) with g
 = g and then check
if P   0 holds. Similarly, Case 2 applies if the solution of (24)-(27) with P  = 0 satises
g < g . Appendix A.3 shows that this procedure yields a unique solution:
g =
8><>:g if g  g
max;
g = 1

B   H     1   g

if g  gmax;
(29)
P  =
8><>:P
 = 1 
h
B   H    

 + 1  

g
i
if g  gmax;
0 if g  gmax;
(30)
where gmax 

 +

1    
 1
(B   H   ) > 0: (31)
Equation (29) shows that the asymptotic rate of economic growth g is increasing in g for
g  gmax and thereafter decreases with g . In particular, for the equilibrium path to be
nondegenerate, the output must grow at a nonnegative rate, which requires the government
to set g between 0 and g
lim  (1  ) 1(B  H   ) > gmax. Given g 2 [0; glim], we
conrm in Appendix A.3 that the solutions to the other variables lie in the feasible range
and that the transversality condition (19) is satised. In addition, this NABGP is saddle
stable under a reasonable restriction of the parameter values, as stated below.
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Figure 3: Growth rate of environmental tax and the NABGP. The upper panel shows the
relationship between the growth rate of the environmental tax (g ) and that of human capital (gH), physical
capital (gK), output (g
), and pollution (gP ). The lower panel shows the level to which pollution converges
in the long run (Pt ! P ). Parameters:  = :3,  = :2,  = 2,  = :05 B = 1,  = :5,  = :25, q = :1,
q^ = :02, K = :05, H = :065 (these imply  = :005,  = :01, H = :09, and K = :1).
Proposition 2 A NABGP uniquely exists if and only if the asymptotic growth rate of the
per-unit tax on the polluting input, g , is between 0 and g
lim  (1  ) 1(B  H  ).
The long-term rate of economic growth follows an inverted V shape against g 2 [0; glim]
and is maximized at g = g
max  ( + 1   ) 1(B   H   ). In addition, if  = <
(1  2)=(1    ), the equilibrium path is locally saddle stable.17
Proof of stability: in Appendix A.4.
Once the environmental tax policy g determines the asymptotic growth rate of output
(29), the growth rates of human capital and pollution are obtained by (23) and gP = g
 g
from (6). Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the environmental tax policy and the
evolution of variables in the long run. When the environmental tax rate is asymptotically
constant (i.e., when g = 0), the asymptotic growth rates of all endogenous variables are
17Given that the share of physical capital  is around 0.3 in reality, (1  2)=(1    ) is likely to be
positive. (When  = 0:3 and  = 0:1, for example, (1 2)=(1  ) = 2=3.) In addition, the percentage
of physical capital destroyed by a disaster, denoted by , is typically higher than that for human capital  .
This implies,  = = (  q^)=(q^) =  =, is typically low. Therefore, we reasonably assume that parameters
satisfy condition  = < (1  2)=(1    ) in Proposition 2
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zero. This means that the economy settles to a no-growth steady state. In this steady
state, the amount of pollution converges to P  = (B   H   )=  P , which causes the
probability of losing physical and human capital to be so high that agents lose the incentive
to accumulate capital beyond a certain level. Interestingly, the asymptotic level of Pt does
not depend on the level of the environmental tax rate, t, as long as t is asymptotically
constant. Nonetheless, given Yt = tPt= from (6), a higher tax rate induces the economy
to converge to a higher output level. This implies that a higher level of the environmental
tax rate promotes growth in the transition, but not in the long run.
When the government raises the per-unit tax rate on polluting inputs at an asymptot-
ically constant rate (g > 0), the asymptotic level of Pt can be kept below P , which helps
to overcome the barrier to capital accumulation. When g is increased within the range
of [0; gmax], the long-run amount of pollution P  decreases, as does the risk of natural
disasters. The reduced risk of natural disasters encourages agents to accumulate capital
more quickly. As a result, the growth rate of physical capital gK increases in parallel with
g (i.e., gK = g ). The growth rate of human capital, gH , also increases with g , and more
than proportionately to physical capital. This makes possible sustained growth without
increasing the use of the polluting input.
The long-term rate of economic growth is maximized at g = g
max, under which the use
of polluting inputs Pt converges asymptotically to the zero level (Pt ! P  = 0). However,
a further acceleration of the tax rate does not enhance economic growth: although it
accelerates the convergence of the risk of natural disasters to the lowest level (qt = q),
the acceleration in the decrease of the eective productivity of rms, ~A =(1 ), has a
dominant negative eect on growth in the long run. As a result, g is no longer increasing in
parallel with g , but is decreasing in g . In particular, if g > g
lim, the decrease of eective
productivity is so fast that it cannot be compensated for by the faster accumulation of
human capital or the quicker convergence of the disaster risk. This results in negative
growth.
5 Welfare-maximizing Policy
In previous sections, we examined the relationship between the environmental policy and
the feasibility of sustained economic growth. Even when production requires polluting
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inputs and the use of polluting inputs raises the risk of natural disasters, we showed that
economic growth can be sustained in the long run if the government gradually increases the
tax rate on the polluting inputs. We also found that an environmental policy maximizes
the long-term rate of economic growth. However, this does not necessarily mean that
such an environmental policy is desirable in terms of welfare. This section considers the
welfare-maximizing policy and examines whether it diers from the growth-maximizing
policy.
Let us consider the social planner's problem. The social planner maximizes the repre-
sentative household's expected utility (9) subject to resource constraints (4) and (5). From
the rst-order conditions for optimality, we show in Appendix A.5 that the dynamics of
Kt, Ht, ut and Ct in the welfare-maximizing path are exactly the same as those for the
market equilibrium given by Equations (4), (5), (17) and (18). The transversality condition
(19) is also the same. The remaining condition for the social planner's problem is that the
amount of polluting input should be:
Pt = 


Kt
Yt
+  
(1    )
But
 1
: (32)
Recall that in the market economy, the government sets the tax rate t and rms choose
Pt according to Pt = Yt=t, as shown by Equation (6). Therefore, if the tax rate at each
point in time satises:
t = Kt +  Ht
(1    )Yt
ButHt
; (33)
then the rms' decision on Pt in the market equilibrium exactly coincides with the opti-
mality condition (32). Given that the remaining conditions for the social optimum are the
same as those for the market equilibrium, this means that the welfare-maximizing alloca-
tion can be achieved as a market equilibrium when the government set the environmental
tax rate using the following rule (33).18 This policy rule has an intuitive interpretation as
the RHS of (33) represents the social marginal cost of using Pt: the rst term represents the
marginal increase in the expected damage to physical capital with respect to Pt, whereas
the second term represents that to human capital, both measured in terms of nal goods
(in particular, (1  )Yt=(ButHt) is the shadow price of human capital in terms of nal
18We assume that all private agents are price takers and do not behave strategically. In this setting, a
time-varying policy (a function only of time, as considered in the previous section) and a policy rule (a
function of state variables such as equation Equation 33) result in the same outcome.
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Figure 4: Determination of the optimal growth rate of the environmental tax. This gure plots
the RHS and LHS of condition (34) against g . The asymptotic growth rate of the optimal environmental
tax is gopt , as given by the intersection, and is lower than the growth-maximizing rate, g
max. The parameters
are the same as in Figure 3.
goods). Thus, it is optimal to let rms pay the sum of these marginal expected damages
on each use of Pt.
Let us characterize the equilibrium path under the optimal tax policy. Similarly to
the previous section, we limit our attention to NABGP. Equation (30) shows that the
asymptotic value of Pt on the NABGP is determined as a function of g , which can be
written as P (g ). Similarly, the asymptotic values of zt  Yt=Kt and ut are determined
as functions of g from (58)-(63) in Appendix A.3, and hence we can write them as z
(g )
and u(g ). For the welfare-maximizing condition (32) to hold in the long run, g should
satisfy:
P (g ) = 


1
z(g )
+
 (1    )
Bu(g )
 1
: (34)
As illustrated in Figure 4, condition (34) can be interpreted as the coincidence of the
actual amount of asymptotic pollution in equilibrium (the LHS) and the optimal amount
of asymptotic pollution (the RHS), where both sides are determined by tax policy g . The
actual pollution is positive but decreasing in g for g 2 [0; gmax), and is zero for g  gmax.
On the other hand, the optimal amount of pollution is positive for all g  0, and at g = 0,
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is lower than P  (B   H   )= given that parameters satisfy:19
(=(K +  P + ) +  (1    )=) P > : (35)
Therefore, under condition (35), the two curves have an intersecting point gopt 2 (0; gmax),
at which point the optimality condition (34) is satised. The following proposition formally
states this result.
Proposition 3 Suppose the parameters satisfy condition (35). Then among the NABGP,
there exists a path that maximizes the welfare of the representative household (9). This
path can be realized by tax policy (33), and the asymptotic growth rate of the optimal per
unit tax, gopt , is strictly positive but lower than the growth-maximizing rate, gmax.
Note that condition (35) is satised unless both  and  are large. Intuitively, it pays
to enjoy a high level of consumption, production and, therefore, pollution today at the cost
of accepting a higher risk of natural disasters only when the household heavily discounts
the future (large ) and production substantially relies on polluting inputs (large ). If
either the household values the future or the dependence of production on polluting inputs
is limited, then sustained economic growth is not only feasible but also desirable. It is also
notable, however, that the optimal policy does not coincide with the growth-maximizing
policy (gopt < gmax). Thus, if the government cares about welfare, it should employ a
milder policy for protecting the environment than when growth is their only concern. The
dierence between the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing policies is similar to the
dierence between the golden rule and the modied golden rule. Although an aggressive
environmental policy that aims to eliminate the emission of pollutants in the long run (i.e.,
P  = 0) may maximize the economic growth rate in the very long run, the cost in the
form of the reduced eective productivity that must be incurred during the transition can
overwhelm the benet that can be reaped only far in the future.
6 Extension I: Stock of Pollution
In reality, the risk of natural disasters is often aected not only by how much current rms
emit pollution, but also how much they emitted in the past. For example, the use of fossil
19When g = 0, Equations (30), (58), and (60) show that P
 = (B H )=  P , z = (K+ P+)=
and u = =B. Substituting these into both sides of (34) shows that the intercept of the LHS is lower than
that of the RHS if (35) holds.
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fuels in the past increases the the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere today, and
this aects tropical sea surface temperature, and therefore the risk of disastrous hurricanes.
To this point, for simplicity we do not distinguish between the ow of pollution and its
stock. This section examines how the long-term properties obtained in previous sections
change when pollution stocks aect the risk of natural disasters.
As before, we assume that rms use a polluting input (e.g., fossil fuels), causing them
to emit pollution. Let ejt denote the emission of pollution by rm j per unit of time. One
unit of polluting input yields one unit of emission, so ejt also represents the amount of
polluting input used by rm j. The production function (1) is modied to:
yjt = Ak

jtn
1  
jt e

jt; (36)
where we substituted ejt for pjt. The aggregate emission Et 
R
ejtdj adds to the pollution
stock Pt, which is now dened by:
Pt  
Z t
 1
Ese
 P (t s)ds: (37)
There are two parameters in the accumulation process:  represents the marginal impact
of emissions on the pollution stock, and P denotes the depreciation rate of the pollution
stock (e.g., the fraction of greenhouse gases being absorbed by the oceans during a unit of
time). If P is smaller, use of a polluting input today has an impact on the environment
for a longer period in the future. We assume the risk of natural disasters is aected by the
pollution stock Pt, as described by (2) and (3). The law of motion for physical capital can
then be written as:
_Kt = Yt   Ct   (K + Pt)Kt; Yt = AKt (utHt)1  Et ; (38)
whereas that for human capital stock remains the same as (5). Note that Pt in these
equations should now be interpreted as the pollution stock at t rather than the amount of
polluting input used at t.
6.1 Market economy under stock pollution
In the market economy, the government levies an environmental tax t on each unit of
polluting input ejt used by the rm. Similar to the analysis in Section 3.1, the rst-order
conditions for rms can be aggregated as (7) and:
Et = Yt=t: (39)
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The behavior of households is exactly the same as described in Section 3.2. In this setting,
the equilibrium dynamics of fKt;Ht; ut; Ct; Et; Ptg are characterized by (5), (17), (18),
(37), (38), (39), and the transversality conditions (19).
Let us consider the NABGP, where the growth rates of all inputs, output, and con-
sumption are asymptotically constant in the long run (recall Denition 1). The following
proposition shows that the long-run property of the equilibrium is unaected by the intro-
duction of accumulated pollution.
Proposition 4 In an economy where pollution accumulates through (37) and (39), a
NABGP exists if and only if the asymptotic growth rate of the per-unit tax on pollut-
ing input, g , is between 0 and g
lim  (1      ) 1(B   H   ). On the NABGP, the
values of g, z, , u, and P  are the same as the baseline model, where pollution does
not accumulate. The level of emission asymptotically converges to E = (P =)P .
Proof: in Appendix A.6.
The asymptotic growth rate of the economy is again an inverted V-shape against the
growth rate of the environmental tax, as illustrated in Figure 3. Note that the long-run
amount of pollution stock P  does not depend on the parameters of pollution accumulation
( and P ). This is interesting because if P is smaller, the eect of emissions on the
pollution stock remains for a longer time, and therefore Pt would become higher, provided
that the amount of emissions is the same; i.e., independence of P  from these parameters
implies that the amount of emissions must change with the parameters. In fact, from
(39) and Proposition 4, we see that the level of output asymptotes to Yt = tEt= !
tPP
=(), which is lower when the eect of pollution remains for a longer time. This
means that the amount of production, and therefore the amount of emissions, is adjusted
so that the pollution stock becomes asymptotically P , which depends on the growth rate
of  but not on P and . A larger P (or ) might temporarily increase the pollution
stock Pt, but higher Pt would cause more frequent natural disasters, which destroy capital
stocks and eventually lower the demand for the polluting input to the initial level. As a
result, the dierence in the accumulation process (P and ) has level eects on output,
but not growth eects.
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6.2 Welfare-maximizing policy under stock pollution
Next, let us turn to welfare maximization. The social planner maximizes welfare (9)
subject to resource constraints (5), (37), and (38). In Appendix A.7, we solve the dynamic
optimization problem and again nd that the dynamics of Kt, Ht, ut, and Ct in the welfare-
maximizing path are exactly the same as those for the market equilibrium (Equations 4,
5, 17, 18 and 19). The optimal amount of emissions is given by:
Et =  YtC
 
t
t
;
where t =  
Z 1
t
C s

Ks +  
(1    )Ys
Bus

e (+P )(s t)ds
(40)
which represents the shadow value of one additional unit of polluting stock, which is, of
course, negative. The optimal stock of pollution is obtained by substituting (40) into (37).
Observe that the only dierence between the market equilibrium and the welfare-
maximizing path is between (39) and (40). In particular, when the government sets the
tax rate by:
t =
 t
C t
= 
Z 1
t
e P (s t)

Ks +  
(1    )Ys
Bus
 
C s e (s t)
C t
!
ds; (41)
the market economy coincides with the welfare-maximizing path; i.e., (41) gives the optimal
policy when pollution accumulates. When a rm emits pollution in year t, it has negative
eects on the environment for all years s  t. The integral on the RHS represents the
cumulative negative eects of emissions for year t. More precisely, the rst part of the
integral, e P (s t), is the portion of emissions remaining by year s. The second part,
Ks +  (1    )Ys=(Bus), is essentially the same as (33), representing the marginal
negative eect of the polluting stock in year s. The nal part, C s e (s t)=Ct , is the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between year s and t, and represents how we
discount the future.
While equation (41) has a natural interpretation, the implementation of the optimal
policy is not obvious because the optimal tax rate in year t depends on the whole time
path of the economy in the future, which in turn depends on the whole path of the tax
rate in the future. Following Section 5, we solve this problem by focusing on the family
of NABGPs. In the NABGPs, Ys = Yte
g(s t), Cs = Cteg
(s t), Ks = Kteg
(s t), ut = u,
Ys=Ks = z
 hold asymptotically. Substituting these for (41) and calculating the integral,
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Figure 5: Optimal tax policy when pollution accumulates.
we can see that on a NABGP, the tax rate should be:
t =
Yt
(   1)g + + P


z
+  
1    
Bu

: (42)
From Equation (39) and Proposition 4, the environmental tax rate determines the
amount of pollution as P  = E=P = Yt=P t. Proposition 4 also implies that, in the
market equilibrium with stock pollution, P , g, z and u are still determined by (29),
(30) and (58)-(63) as functions of g , and therefore can be represented as P
(g ), g(g ),
z(g ) and u(g ). Using these, the optimality condition (42) can be expressed as
P (g ) = 

1 +
(   1)g(g ) + 
P


z(g )
+  
1    
Bu(g )
 1
: (43)
The LHS of (43) is the actual amount of pollution stock under tax policy g , while the
RHS can be interpreted as the optimal amount of pollution stock. Both sides change with
g , and the optimal g is such that the LHS and the RHS coincide. Figure 5 plots them
against g for the three dierent levels of P . Observe that when P is innitely large,
the term ((   1)g + )=P vanishes, and condition (43) coincides with (34). Thus, the
optimal policy is the same as in Section 5. In fact, the baseline model in which the ow of
pollution aects the disaster risk is a special case where both  and P are very large as
the accumulation equation (37) reduces to Pt = Et when  = P ! 1. Intuitively, when
the eect of emission depreciates very quickly, only the current use of the polluting input
aects the risk of natural disasters. However, when P is nite (i.e., when the eects of
emissions remain for some time), the RHS is higher than in the previous case. Accordingly,
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the intersecting point in Figure 5 moves toward the upper left. The following proposition
summarizes:
Proposition 5 Suppose that pollution accumulates through (37) and (39), where P is
nite. Then, the asymptotic growth rate of the optimal tax rate, gopt , is lower than in
Proposition 3. Moreover, as P becomes smaller (i.e., when the eects of emissions remain
for a longer time), gopt falls and the asymptotic pollution, P , rises. The optimal long-
term rate of economic growth is also lower than in Proposition 3 and falls as P becomes
smaller.
Previously, we have shown in Proposition 3 that in the case where pollution does not
accumulate, the welfare-maximizing environmental policy is less strict than the growth-
maximizing policy. Proposition 5 shows that, when emissions have a longer-lasting eect,
it is optimal to adopt an even less strict environmental tax policy. This implies that the
gap between the growth-maximizing policy and the welfare-maximizing policy is even larger
when pollution accumulates.
We can again interpret this apparently paradoxical result in terms of time preference.
When emissions have a longer eect, the larger part of the social cost of using the polluting
input comes long after the benet of using the polluting input (i.e., larger output) is
realized. Thus, as long as the agent discounts the future, there is more social gain in
accepting a high level of pollution stock and lower growth in the long run than where
pollution does not accumulate. Specically, observe that (   1)g +  in condition (43)
represents the rate of decrease in the marginal utility C
 ( 1)
t e
 t. Because this expression
is always positive on the NABGP (recall  > 0,  > 0 and g  0), there is a benet from
frontloading output, which makes the optimal pollution in (43) higher than (34). As a
result, it is optimal to increase the environmental tax more slowly.
7 Extension II: Non-insurable Risks
In most developed countries, life insurance is available to compensate for the loss of ex-
pected income when a household member dies or is disabled permanently. However, partial
and temporary losses of human capital are generally more dicult to insure against, mainly
because there is no objective and veriable way to measure human capital. When a natural
disaster hits an area and destroys some rms or an industry (or forces them to close for an
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extended period), it damages the rm-specic or even industry-specic human capital of
workers in that area. Although the lifetime incomes of those workers would be signicantly
aected in such an event, insurance for this type of risk is rarely available. While previous
sections assumed that the damages to human capital are fully insured, this section explores
how non-insurable disaster risks to human capital aect the relationship between economic
growth and the environmental tax policy. For simplicity, we ignore the accumulation of
pollution.
Without insurance, households explicitly consider the possibility that they may lose a
part of their human capital stock according to the stochastic process (14). Because natural
disasters occur idiosyncratically, the unavailability of insurance also means that there are
non-trivial ex-post distributions in the asset holdings and consumption among households.
To make the analysis clear and tractable, we slightly change the way in which the revenue
from environmental tax is distributed: this section assumes that the tax revenue, Pt = Yt
from (6), is distributed as a consumption subsidy Ct (or a reduction in consumption tax,
if one exists), rather than a uniform transfer, so that the redistribution does not aect
the intertemporal consumption decisions among households.20 The constant subsidy rate
 is determined so that the government runs a balanced budget in the long run; i.e.,
 = limt!1 Yt=Ct, which is well dened in the NABGP, as we conrm later.21 In this
setting, the evolution of household assets ait, except at the time when the household is hit
by a natural disaster, is modied from (12) to
_ait
ait
= (1  it)rt + it

B   H + _wt
wt

   cit
ait
;   1  : (44)
7.1 Optimization of households under non-insurable risks
Every household i maximizes its lifetime expected utility (9) subject to budget constraints
(14) and (44). In Appendix A.8, we show that this problem can be solved as a dynamic
20If perfect insurance is available, the uniform transfer and the constant rate consumption subsidy yield
the same equilibrium outcome. Without insurance, however, the uniform transfer has a side eect of directly
reducing the income risk of households by providing a stable ow of income. A constant-rate consumption
subsidy does not aect households' intertemporal consumption decisions, as is conrmed by (47).
21If there is a government surplus in the transition, we assume that the government uniformly distributes
the present value of the surplus T0 =
R1
0
(Yt Ct) exp(
R t
0
rt0dt
0)dt at the beginning in a lump-sum fashion
by issuing debts so that there are no government savings or debts in the long run. If the surplus is negative,
the government levies a lump-sum tax  T0 at the beginning.
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programming (DP) problem in continuous time. From the rst-order condition for the
asset allocation it, we obtain:
B   H    Pt + _wt=wt = rt + (q + q^Pt)R(it); where (45)
R(it)  E
h
(1  itit) it
i
   ; R(0) = 0; R0(it) > 0: (46)
Condition (45) resembles the arbitrage condition (16), but it states that the expected
return from holding human capital (represented by the LHS) should now be higher than
the interest rate by (q + q^Pt)R(it) to compensate for the exposure to the non-insurable
risk. When a household is hit by a natural disaster, it loses a fraction itit of its total
assets and reduces consumption from cit to (1  itit)cit. As a result, the marginal utility
increases by a factor of (1  itit)  > 1. Function R(it) shows that, in terms of utility,
the cost of disaster damage of a given size it is multiplied by (1   itit) , compared to
the case where the household is able to pay an insurance premium to avoid such a change
in marginal utility. Because this additional loss is incurred with probability (q + q^Pt) per
unit time, households require a \risk premium" of (q + q^Pt)R(it) to hold human capital.
The risk premium function (46) depends only on the damage distribution 	(it) and the
relative risk aversion . Figure 6(i) and (ii) depict various density functions for 	(it)
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the corresponding shapes of the function R(it). Observe that R(it) is upward sloping and
convex because increased exposure to the non-insurable risk raises the risk premium. In
addition, even when   E[it] is the same, a more dispersed damage distribution increases
the risk premium because it enhances the extreme possibilities in which the household loses
most of its human capital. Because R(it) is monotonic in it, there exists a unique value
of it that satises the condition (45), given prices and pollution. Because this optimal
allocation is the same for all households, we simply write it as t.
23
Next, from the envelope condition for the DP problem, we obtain the evolution of
22We choose the Beta distribution as an example because it take various shapes depending on its param-
eters, and also because its support is the interval (0; 1), which is consistent with our assumption for the
damage distribution 	(it). Its probability density function is proportional to 
a 1
it (1   it)b 1, where we
choose parameters a and b to match the specied mean and standard deviation.
23If a household loses a portion of human capital due to a natural disaster, its it might temporarily
fall below the optimal value. However, the household then regains the optimal asset allocation through
intensive education by spending its savings. For simplicity, we assume that this adjustment occurs quickly
so that (almost) all households share the same t.
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(i) Density of damage distribution 	() (ii) Risk premium function R()
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Figure 6: Examples of risk premium and precautionary savings functions. Damage distribution
	() is specied as Beta distributions with mean  = :25 and three dierent standard deviations: 0.1 (thin
curve), 0.2 (thick curve), and 0.3 (dashed curve). Risk aversion parameter  is set to 2.
consumption cit for each household:
  _cit
cit
+ (q + q^Pt)
n
E

(1  tit) 
  1o =   rt; (47)
which must hold for all i and t except the time when household i is hit by natural disasters.
When compared to the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule,   _cit=cit =  rt, (47) has an extra
term (the second term on the LHS) that represents the expected change in the marginal
utility due to the risk of natural disasters. As explained above, each household is hit by
a disaster with probability qt = (q + q^Pt) per unit time, and at that time consumption
drops from cit to (1   tit)cit. Because natural disasters occur idiosyncratically, we can
calculate the aggregate fall in consumption due to natural disasters per unit time as:R
qt

cit   (1   tit)cit
	
di = (q + q^Pt)  tCt. Aggregating the individual evolution of
consumption (47) and then subtracting the above fall, we obtain the evolution of the
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aggregate consumption:
_Ct
Ct
=
1

h
rt   + (q + q^Pt)S(t)
i
; where (48)
S(t)  E

(1  tit) 
  1    t; S(0) = 0; S0(t) > 0: (49)
When compared to the case where perfect insurance is available (see equation 18, where
rt = Yt=Kt   K   Pt), condition (48) implies that the non-insurable risks lead to more
savings, so the aggregate consumption growth is faster by (1=)(q + q^Pt)S(t). This is
\precautionary saving" in the sense that the non-insurable risk induces households to save
more as a precaution against possible losses of human capital by natural disasters.24 Thus,
we call S(t) the precautionary saving function. Figure 6(iii) shows the shapes of function
S(t) for three examples of damage distributions. The shapes are similar to R(t), although
they tend to have higher curvatures. Naturally, a higher exposure to risk (a higher t) and
a more dispersed damage distribution will lead to more precautionary savings.
7.2 NABGP for market equilibrium with non-insurable risks
Similarly to Section 4, let us focus on the nondegenerate, asymptotically balanced growth
paths (NABGP) where the growth rates of Yt, Kt, Ht, Ct and t are asymptotically constant
and u  limt!1 ut, z  limt!1 Yt=Kt and t  limt!1Ct=Kt are well dened. Because
all households have the same t in the presence of non-insurable risks, the denition of it in
(13) can be aggregated for all i. Then, using the market clearing conditions,25
R
sitdi = Kt
and
R
hitdi = Ht, and substituting wt from (7), we see that t is asymptotically constant
at
  lim
t!1 t =
(1    )z
Bu + (1    )z : (50)
The behavior of rms is not aected by unavailability of insurance because rms only
care for expected prots. The resource constraints are also the same as the benchmark
24Lord and Rangazas (1998) quantitatively examined the extent to which the riskiness of human capital
investment increases the saving rate, although they did not explicitly consider natural disasters.
25In transition, the equilibrium of the credit market requires
R
sitdi   Dt = Kt, where the government
debt Dt evolves according to _Dt = Ct Yt+rtDt. On the NABGP, Yt=Ct = (Yt=Kt)=(Ct=Kt) converges
to a constant value z=, and the government can achieve a balanced budget by setting  = z=.
In addition, because T0 (  D0) is chosen to match the present value of government surplus during the
transition, Dt converges to zero in the long run. Therefore,
R
sitdi = Kt holds on the NABGP.
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model. Therefore, the equilibrium conditions for the NABGP are the same as (24){(28),
except that, from (45) and (48), the arbitrage condition (26) and the Keynes{Ramsey rule
(27) should be replaced, respectively, by
  
1     g = (z
   K   P )  (B   H    P ) + (q + q^P )R(); (51)
g = (z   K   P )  + (q + q^P )S(): (52)
The six conditions (24), (25), (28), and (50){(52) determine six unknowns (g, z, , u,
P , ) on the NABGP as a function of the tax policy g  limt!1 _t=t  0.
Let us illustrate how the unavailability of insurance inuences the relationship between
the environmental tax policy g and the asymptotic growth rate g
 under a given value
of . From conditions (28), (51), and (52), the asymptotic economic growth rate on the
NABGP g can be calculated as:
G(g ; ) =
8><>:g if g  G
max()
1

h
B   H     1   g   q fR()  S()g
i
if g  Gmax();
(53)
where Gmax() =

 +

1    
 1
(B   H     q fR()  S()g) : (54)
We also obtain P  = 0 when g  Gmax(). This result resembles the case of perfect
insurance (equations 29-31), except that (53) and (54) depend on the dierence between
the risk premium and precautionary saving functions. Note also that the solution depends
on , which is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Let us focus on the range of g
under which the NABGP uniquely exists, where  should be representable as a function
(g ). When (g ) is substituted for  in the second line of equation (53), it is clear
that the relationship between g and g
 for the case of g  Gmax() is no longer linear.
However, as long as
 q R0((g ))  S0((g )) d(g )
dg
<

1     whenever g > G
max((g )); (55)
function G(g ; (g )) is decreasing in g for g > Gmax((g )), and hence the tax policy
that attains g = G
max((g )) maximizes the long-term growth. We found that condition
(55) is likely to be satised under reasonable parameter values.26
26Because P  = 0 for all g > Gmax(), the marginal eect of environmental tax policy on equilibrium
is limited. In addition, as shown in gure 6(iv), the absolute value of R0()   S0() is not very large as
long as  is reasonably far from 1, which is true in equilibrium.
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Under condition (55), function Gmax() in (54) simultaneously represents the growth-
maximizing rate of tax increase and the highest attainable long-run growth rate. Equation
(54) can be interpreted intuitively: the risk premium eect R() skews the investments
away from the human capital, whereas the precautionary saving eect S() increases the
overall investment. If the risk premium eect is stronger, the absence of insurance lowers
the human capital investment,27 and hence the highest attainable long-run growth rate
Gmax(). Because slower output growth implies fewer uses of Pt, the growth-maximizing
environmental policy should also be milder (i.e., a lower g ). To the contrary, if the pre-
cautionary saving eect S() is stronger, the absence of perfect insurance makes possible
higher long-term economic growth. However, even when Gmax() is higher, the rst line
of (53) implies that the higher growth is realized only when the government implements a
stricter environmental policy (i.e., a higher g ). If g is unchanged, the increased invest-
ments will induce rms to use more Pt until the increased damages to physical and human
capital eventually nullify the increased savings.
7.3 Relative signicance of risk premium and precautionary savings
In the following, we examine the relative signicance of the two eects under a given set of
parameters and damage distribution. From the denitions of R() and S() in (46) and
(49), we can show that the risk premium eect dominates the precautionary saving eect
if and only if  is smaller than a critical value :
Lemma 2 For any damage distribution of it  	(it), whose support is within interval
(0; 1), and for any risk aversion parameter  > 1, there exists a unique value of  such that
R() = S() holds. In addition, R() > S() holds for  2 (0; ), and R() < S() holds
for  2 (; 1].
Proof: in Appendix A.9.
Figure 6(iv) depicts the representative shapes of R()   S(), which conrms that
the precautionary savings eect is stronger only if  is larger than a certain threshold.
We next derive the value of  under a growth-maximizing policy through a guess-and-
verify method. Let us start with a guess ~ 2 (0; 1) of unknown , and suppose that
27Although the risk premium eect may increase the physical capital investment, it contributes to eco-
nomic growth only in a transitory manner because the production sector is subject to decreasing marginal
product with respect to physical capital.
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Figure 7: The fraction of human capital in the total assets under the growth-maximizing
policy (represented as ^). Under condition (57), function f() and the 45-degree line have a unique
intersection at ^. If f() > , then the intersection must be to the right of , and vice versa. Parameters
are the same as in Figure 3, and 	(it) is specied as a Beta distribution with mean  = :25 and standard
deviation 0.2. In this setting, we obtain  = :738, ^ = :772 > . If  is higher, at 0:4, we obtain
^ = :672 < .
the government sets the implied growth-maximizing policy g = G
max(~), which means
g = g = Gmax(~) and P  = 0. Suppose also that households take ~ as given. Then, u
and z are calculated from (25) and (52), where ~ is substituted for . By substituting
these results into (50), we obtain the actual asset allocation  on the NABGP as a function
of the initial guess ~:
 = f(~)  

+
! + q! [R(~)  S(~)]
   q [(1  )R(~) + S(~)]
 1
; (56)
where we dene constants by !  (1   )=((1      ) + ) 2 (0; 1),   =((1     
) + ) 2 (0; 1), !  (1  !)(B   H) + ! > 0,   (1  )(B   H) + + K > 0, and
 = (1    )= > 0, all of which depend only on parameters. If f(~) coincides with ~,
then the initial guess ~ was correct. Formally stated, a tax policy g attains the highest
long-term growth if, and only if, (g ) 2 (0; 1) is a xed point of function f().
Now we need to check whether the above xed point is lower or higher than . Denition
(56) implies that as long as q is reasonably small, function f() is continuous in  and
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satises28
f() 2 (0; 1) and f 0() < 1 for all  2 [0; 1]: (57)
Given condition (57), the intermediate value theorem implies that the xed point of (56)
uniquely exists, which we denote by ^. In addition, as depicted in Figure 7, ^ is larger (or
smaller) than  if and only if f() = (+ !=(   qR())) 1 is larger (or smaller) than .
Combining this result with Lemma 2, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the disaster damages to human capital are not insurable and
that conditions (55) and (57) are satised. Then, the long-term rate of growth is unimodal
with respect to g and maximized at g = G
max(^)  (+ 1   ) 1(B  H    qfR(^) 
S(^)g), where ^ is the xed point of function f() in (56). If f() = (+ !=( qR() +
)) 1 is larger than  dened in Lemma 2, the precautionary savings eect S(^) dominates
the risk premium eect R(^), so the growth-maximizing rate of tax increase, Gmax(^), is
higher than gmax in Proposition 2. The opposite holds if f() < .
Proposition 6 states that the basic relationship between the environmental tax and the
long-term growth is preserved under the presence of non-insurable risks, but the precise
growth-maximizing tax policy can be either more or less strict than the benchmark case.
As depicted in Figure 7, we conrmed that both cases are possible depending on the
parameter values. In particular, if the parameters satisfy f() > , the maximized rate of
growth is higher than the case with perfect insurance. However, this only means that the
unavailability of insurance widens the discrepancy between the equilibrium allocation under
growth-maximizing environmental policy and the welfare-maximizing allocation because
the latter is unchanged given the resource constraint (see Proposition 3). Thus, even when
the unavailability of insurance creates an additional possibility of higher growth through a
stricter environmental policy, it is not likely to improve the welfare of agents.
28For a reasonably small q > 0, both the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in (56) become
positive, which is a sucient condition for f() 2 (0; 1) and the continuity of f() for all  2 [0; 1]. In
addition,  aects the value of f() only through R() and S(), and both are multiplied by q. Thus, the
gradient of f() is unlikely to exceed 1.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the sustainability of economic growth in a two-sector endogenous
growth model when taking into account the risk of natural disasters. Here, polluting inputs
are necessary for production, though they also intensify the risk of natural disasters. In
this setting, we obtained the following results.
First, economic growth can be sustained in the long run only if the per unit tax on
the polluting input increases over time. Although economic growth ceteris paribus induces
private rms to use more of the polluting input, this environmental policy can lead rms
to use more human capital (e.g., by investing in alternative technologies), which decreases
their reliance on polluting inputs, and thereby prevents the risk of disaster from rising to a
critical level. However, it should be noted that we do not consider the cost associated with
extracting resources or the niteness of these inputs. If the cost is signicant and changes
for some reason, the environmental tax rate must be adjusted to absorb these changes. A
next step in our research agenda would be to integrate the analysis of natural disasters
with a study of the niteness of natural resources. This is clearly beyond the scope of this
rst attempt.
Second, the long-term rate of economic growth follows an inverted V-shaped curve
relative to the growth rate of the environmental tax. When the rate of environmental tax
is currently slowly growing, its acceleration will reduce the asymptotic level of emissions
and the risk of natural disasters. This process enhances the incentive to save and hence
promotes economic growth. When the rate of environmental tax is already fast growing, the
asymptotic level of pollution is fairly small so that further acceleration of the environmental
tax excessively impairs the productivity of private rms. This works against economic
growth. Therefore, economic growth can be maximized with the choice of the most gradual
increase in the environmental tax rate that minimizes the amount of pollution in the long
run. We also nd that, if the disaster damages to human capital are not insurable, the
growth-maximizing environmental tax policy is aected by the relative strength of the risk
premium eect and the precautionary savings eect: the former skews the investment away
from human capital, whereas the latter increases the overall savings as a precaution. If
the precautionary savings eect dominates, economic growth can be further accelerated by
raising the speed of the tax increase.
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Third, social welfare is maximized under a less strict (i.e., more slowly increasing)
environmental tax policy than the growth-maximizing policy. This may appear paradoxical
in that welfare considerations justify more pollution than when growth is the foremost
policy concern. This is because maximization of the long-term rate of growth requires the
minimization of the asymptotic level of pollution, but this can only be achieved only in
the long run. As long as people discount the future, aiming for this ultimate goal would
be too costly in terms of the eciency loss that must be incurred in the transition. Thus,
a less strict environmental policy is more desirable in terms of the discounted sum of
expected utility. Moreover, when pollutants accumulate gradually and remain in the air
for longer, the transition process takes more time and, therefore, the welfare-maximizing
environmental tax policy is milder.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that g > g (i.e., limt!1 _Yt=Yt > limt!1 _t=t). Then, Pt = Yt=t !1. From
(5) and ut  1, this means _Ht=Ht  B   H    Pt !  1. This contradicts with the
denition of the NABGP, in which gH  limt!1 _Ht=Ht is nite.
A.2 Derivation of (22)
We rst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 In the model with perfect insurance, a sucient condition for the TVC (19) is
that limt!1((1 )(Yt=Kt) (Ct=Kt)) and limt!1 But are strictly negative. A necessary
condition is that they are not strictly positive.
Proof: From (4) and (18), the growth rate of ktc
 
t e
 t is (1   )(Yt=Kt)   (Ct=Kt).
Similarly, from (5), (16) and the Keynes-Ramsey condition  ( _Ct=Ct) =  rt, the growth
rate of ht(wt=B)c
 
t e
 t is  But. The TVC (19) is necessarily satised if these two growth
rates are strictly negative, and it cannot be satised if they are strictly positive. 
We use Lemma 3 to show (22) and asymptotic constancy of ut, Yt=Kt, Ct=Kt. Because
_Ht=Ht and Pt are asymptotically constant on the NABGP, Equation (5) implies that
ut must also be asymptotically constant (gu  0). In addition, the TVC requires gu
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not to be strictly negative from Lemma 3. Therefore, gu = 0. Next, as _Ct=Ct and Pt
are asymptotically constant, Equation (18) implies that the value of Yt=Kt must also be
constant in the long run. This means that the growth rate of Yt=Kt is zero or negative
(g  gK). However, if Yt=Kt ! 0, Equation (4) implies _Kt=Kt < 0, and thus Yt =
(Yt=Kt)Kt ! 0, which is inconsistent with our denition of a NABGP (gC  0). Therefore,
gK = g
. Finally, given that _Kt=Kt and Yt=Kt are asymptotically constant, Equation (4)
in turn implies that Ct=Kt must also be asymptotically constant (gC  gK). However, if
Ct=Kt ! 0, Ct=Kt < (1   )(Yt=Kt) will hold in the long run (recall that Yt=Kt will not
converge to zero), which violates the TVC from Lemma 3. Therefore, gC = gK (= g
).
A.3 Derivation of the NABGP in the benchmark model
Given g , we rst examine the possibility of Case 1 (P
  0 and g = g ). Substituting
g = g into (26) and (27), we obtain P  = 1 
h
B   H    

 + 1  

g
i
. From this,
it turns out that P   0 holds if and only if g  gmax, where gmax is dened in (31).
Substituting g = g into (24)-(27), we also obtain:
z =
1

(g + K + P
 + ) ; (58)
 =
1


(   )g + (1  )(K + P ) + 

; (59)
u =
1
B
((   1)g + ) : (60)
Because the NABGP requires gC  0, we need g = g  0. Therefore, a NABGP in Case
1 is possible only if g 2 [0; gmax]. Substituting the above P  into (58)-(60) shows that
z > 0,  > 0, u 2 (0; 1), and (1 )z  < 0 holds for all g 2 [0; gmax]. From Lemma
3 in Appendix A.2, the last two inequalities imply that the transversality condition (19) is
satised.
Next, we examine the possibility of Case 2 (P  = 0 and g < g ). Substituting P  = 0
for (26) and (27) yields g = 1

B   H     1   g

: It satises condition g < g only
if g > g
max. Substituting P  = 0 and the above g into (24)-(27), we obtain:
z =
1


B + K   H   
1     g

; (61)
 =
 1

  1


B   H   
1     g

+
1  

K +


; (62)
u =
1
B
h
(   1)

B   H   
1     g

+ 
i
: (63)
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Because a NABGP requires g  0, we need g  glim  (1      ) 1(B   H   ).
Therefore, a NABGP in Case 2 is possible only if g 2 (gmax; glim]. Note that (61)-(63)
implies z  0,  > 0, (1   )z    < 0, and u 2 (0; 1) for all g 2 (gmax; glim].
From Lemma 3, the latter two inequalities imply that the transversality condition (19) is
satised.
Observe that those two possibilities are mutually exclusive|a NABGP in Case 1 exists
if and only if g 2 [0; gmax], whereas a NABGP in Case 2 exists if and only if g 2
(gmax; glim]. Therefore, a NABGP uniquely exists whenever g 2 [0; glim].
A.4 Proof of stability in Proposition 2
The equilibrium path is characterized by a four-dimensional dynamics system of fKt;Ht; ut; Ctg,
where the laws of motion for these variables are given by (4), (5), (17), and (18). By making
use of (6), (8), and Nt = utHt, the values of Yt and Pt appearing in these laws of motion
can be expressed in terms of Kt; Ht; ut and t, where the motion of t is given exogenously
by the government. In this dynamic system, Kt and Ht are predetermined state variables,
whereas ut and Ct are jumpable. Therefore, the system is both stable and determinate
when it has a stable manifold of dimension two. For convenience, we transform this system
into another four-dimensional system in fut; t; zt; Ptg, where t  Ct=Kt; z  Yt=Kt
and Pt  Yt=t. This transformed system is equivalent to the original system, be-
cause fKt;Ht; ut; Ctg can be represented in terms of fut; t; zt; Ptg as Kt = tPt=(zt),
Ct = tPtt=(zt), and Ht =
 
1=(1 ) ^= ~A
1=(1 ^)
z
^=(1 ^)
t Pt=(ut). Therefore, saddle
stability (and determinacy) can be established by conrming that this transformed system
has a two-dimensional stable manifold. Using equilibrium conditions (4), (5), (6), (17) and
(18), we can write the dynamics of the system as:
_ut = ut

But   t + zt + Pt + 1    

(B + K   H)  

g

; (64)
_t = t

t      

zt +
   1

Pt   

+
   1

K

; (65)
_zt = zt

 (1    )zt + Pt + 1    

(B + K   H)  

g

; (66)
_Pt = Pt

 t + + (1    )
1   zt +
Pt +
1    

B   + 

g
+
(1  2  )K   (1    )H


(67)
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where  and 
 are constants dened by   (1      )(    )= and 
  ((1   2  
)  (1    ) )=:
We rst examine the stability of the NABGP for the case of g 2 [0; gmax]. In this case
steady state of the transformed system, denoted by fu; ; z; P g, is given by the rst
line of (30) and (58){(60). Applying a rst-order Taylor expansion of equations (64){(67)
around this steady-state yields:26666664
_ut
_t
_zt
_Pt
37777775 '
26666664
uB  u u u
0
0 J1
0
37777775
26666664
ut   u
t   
zt   z
Pt   P 
37777775 ; (68)
where,
J1 
26664
      ( 1) 
0  (1    )z z
 P  +(1  )1  P  
P 
37775 :
We want to show that the Jacobian matrix of (68) has two positive and two negative
eigenvalues. From the block-triangular structure of the matrix, one eigenvalue is uB > 0,
and the other three are given by the eigenvalues of the submatrix J1. The characteristic
equation for J1 is:
 3 + tr(J1)2  M(J1)+ det(J1) = 0; (69)
where tr(J1) is the trace of J1, M(J1) the sum of the principal minors, and det(J1) the
determinant. These are given by:
tr(J1) =

 +    

  (1  2)
 

 +

1    

g +


K +
+ 


+

(1  2)
 
  1    


(B     H);
M(J1) =
     
0  (1    )z
+
 (1    )z z
+(1  )
1  P
 
P 
+
 ( 1) 

 P  
P 
=  1    


(   )(z   ) + 

(1    )

 1    

 z

P 

(   )g + (1  )K + (1  2)P  + 
	
;
det(J1) =
 (1    )

zP ;
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We determine the sign of the real parts of the roots of (69) based on Theorem 1 of Benhabib
and Perli (1994).
Theorem 1 (Benhabib-Perli) The number of roots of the polynomial in (69) with pos-
itive real parts is equal to the number of variations of sign in the scheme
 1 tr(J1)  M(J1) + det(J1)
tr(J1)
det(J1):
Noting that tr(J1) is linear in g and that it is positive at both ends (i.e., tr(J1) > 0 at
g = 0; g
max) under the assumption that  = < (1  2)=(1   ), we have tr(J1) > 0,
M(J1) < 0, and det(J1) > 0. Thus, the above theorem implies that there is only one
eigenvalue with positive real parts in the matrix J1. Combined with Bu
 > 0 obtained
before, we have two positive eigenvalues in total. This completes the stability analysis for
the case of g 2 [0; gmax].
Turning to the case of g 2 (gmax; glim], the (asymptotic) steady state of the transformed
system for this case is given by P  = 0 and (61){(63). The Taylor expansion of Equations
(64){(67) around this steady state yields essentially the same expression as (68), with the
only dierence that submatrix J1 is replaced by:
J2 =
26664
      
0  z(1    )   
0 0 g   g
37775 ;
where g is the asymptotic growth rate of output, which is dened by (29). As J2 is a
triangular matrix, its eigenvalues are simply given by its diagonal elements. Observe that
g   g represents the asymptotic growth rate of Pt = Yt=t, which is negative in this
case. Therefore, J2 has one positive eigenvalue (
) and two negative ones ( z(1  )
and g   g ). This completes the stability analysis for the case of g 2 (gmax; glim].
A.5 Details of welfare maximization
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner's problem is:
H = C
1 
t   1
1   + t[AK

t (utHt)
1  P t   Ct   (K + Pt)Kt]
+ t[B(1  ut)Ht   (H +  Pt)Ht];
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where t and t are the planner's shadow prices associated with the accumulation of phys-
ical capital and human capital, respectively. The rst-order conditions are:
t = C
 
t ; (70)
_t
t
= + Pt + K    Yt
Kt
; (71)
t =
(1    )Yt
ButHt
t; (72)
_t
t
=   t
t
(1    ) Yt
Ht
 B(1  ut) + H +  tPt: (73)
Yt
Pt
= Kt +  t(t=t)Ht; (74)
The resource constraints for the social planner's problem are (4) and (5). Dierentiating
the log of (72) with respect to time, eliminating _t=t and _t=t by (71) and (73), and then
eliminating t=t by (72) gives condition (17). Similarly, dierentiating the log of (70) with
respect to time and eliminating _t=t by (71) gives (18). The transversality conditions for
this problem are limt!1Ktte t = 0 and limt!1Htte t = 0. Eliminating t and t
using (70) and (72), and then introducing wt from (7) shows that these TVCs are the same
as (19). Finally, eliminating (t=t) from (74) by (72) yields condition (32).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is essentially similar to the discussion in Section 4. Note that equation (39)
implies _t=t = _Yt=Yt   _Et=Et, the RHS of which is asymptotically constant from the
denition of NABGPs. Thus, the growth rate of t is also asymptotically constant and
written as g = g
 gE , where gE is the asymptotic growth rate of emission. From this, we
can show that the asymptotic growth rate of economy g cannot exceed g . Observe that
if g > g , the previous equation implies gE > 0. This means emission Et grows without
bound, stock Pt also grows without bound from (37), natural disasters occur increasingly
frequently, and physical and human capital are destroyed at an ever-increasing rate. As
this is obviously incompatible with NABGPs, g  g must hold (See the proof of Lemma
1 in Appendix A.1).
Given g  g , it results that the asymptotic growth rate of emissions is zero or negative
(gE = g
   g  0). In fact, Et > 0 and gE  0 means that the amount of emissions Et
is asymptotically constant: Et ! E  0. Moreover, from (37), the stock of pollution is
also asymptotically constant: Pt ! P   (=P )E  0. It is easy to see that P  = 0
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holds when g < g , because gE < 0 and therefore P  = (=P )E = 0. Thus, condition
(28) in Section 4 holds also for the case of stock pollution. The remaining conditions that
characterize the NABGP are also the same (conditions 24 to 27) because they are derived
from (5), (17), (18), and the rst equation of (38), none of which were changed by the
introduction of pollution stocks. Therefore, the analysis in Appendix A.3 is still valid and
yields the same values of g, z, , u, and P  as in the baseline model.
A.7 Details of welfare maximization with stock pollution
From the denition of pollution stock (37), Pt evolves according to _Pt = Et PPt. Using
this, the current value Hamiltonian for the social planner's problem can be written as:
H = C
1 
t   1
1   + t[AK

t (utHt)
1  Et   Ct   (K + Pt)Kt]
+ t[B(1  ut)Ht   (H +  Pt)Ht] + t[Et   PPt];
where t is the shadow price of pollution stock. The rst-order conditions are given by
(70){(73) and:
Yt
Et
=
 t
t
(75)
_t
t
=
t
t
Kt +
t
t
 Ht + + P : (76)
The TVCs are limt!1Ktte t = 0, limt!1Htte t = 0, and limt!1 Ptte t = 0.
Similar to the analysis for Section 5 (see Appendix A.5), it can be shown that conditions
(70){(73) and the rst two TVCs are the same as the market equilibrium. Note that
Ps  Pte P (s t) holds for all s  t from _Pt = Et  PPt and Et  0. This inequality and
the TVC for Pt jointly imply:
0 = lim
s!1Psse
 s  lim
s!1sPte
 P (s t)e s = Pte t lim
s!1se
 (+P )(s t)  0:
Note that Pt cannot become 0 in nite t, although it may asymptote to 0. Therefore, the
above means:
lim
s!1se
 (+P )(s t) = 0: (77)
In the following, we derive the value of t from (76) and (77). Substituting s for t in
(76) and multiplying both sides by te
 (+P )(s t) gives:
_se
 (+P )(s t)   (+ P )se (+P )(s t) = (sKs + s Hs) e (+P )(s t): (78)
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Observe that the LHS of (78) is the derivative of se
 (+P )(s t) with respect to s. Thus,
we can calculate the denite integral of the LHS from s = t to s!1, which becomes:h
se
 (+P )(s t)
i1
s=t
= lim
s!1se
 (+P )(s t)   t =  t;
where the second equality follows from (77). As this must coincide with the denite integral
of the RHS of (78), we obtain:
 t =
Z 1
t
(sKs + s Hs) e
 (+P )(s t)ds: (79)
Eliminating t and t from (75) and (79) then using (70) and (72) gives (40) in the text.
A.8 Details of household optimization with non-insurable risk
Consider the problem of maximizing the lifetime expected utility (9) subject to budget
constraints (14) and (44) with initial assets ai0 = si0 + (w0=B)hi0 + T0 (see footnote 21).
Let Vt(a) be the value function representing the lifetime expected utility of a household
that holds total assets of a at time t, given the market prices rt and wt and pollution Pt.
Let us rst consider an approximated problem where time is discretized by innitesimally
small intervals of size t.
Then, the optimization problem of the household between time t and t+t can be set
up using the Bellman Equation:
Vt(a) =max
c;
c1    1
1   t+ e
 t(q + q^Pt)t E
h
Vt+t
 
(1  )ai+
e t
 
1  (q + q^Pt)t

Vt+t

a+

(1  )rta+ (B   H + _wt=wt)a  c

t

;
where the stochastic variable  follows the distribution 	(). Observe that (q+ q^Pt)t and 
1   (q + q^Pt)t

in the second and third terms of the RHS represent the probabilities
that a natural disaster will occur and will not occur, respectively, between t and t + t.
The arguments in function Vt+t() following these are the amount of assets at time t+t
conditional on the household being hit and not being hit by a natural disaster, respectively.
Although the above Bellman Equation holds only approximately, we can obtain a precise
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation by Taylor-expanding the RHS and then taking
the limit of t! 0:
Vt(a) =max
c;
c1    1
1   +
@Vt(a)
@t
+ (q + q^Pt)
n
E

Vt
 
(1  )a  Vt(a)o
+ V 0t (a)
n
(1  )rta+ (B   H + _wt=wt)a  c
o
;
(80)
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where we ignore terms of the order of (t)2 and higher because they vanish in the limit
of t ! 0. The second term of (80) represents the change in the functional form of Vt()
due to evolutions in prices and pollution. The rst-order conditions with respect to c and
, respectively, are: V 0t (a) = c =, and
V 0t (a)

(B   H + _wt=wt)  rt
	
= (q + q^Pt)E

V 0t
 
(1  )a: (81)
Recall that the objective function (9) is homothetic in cit and that the budget constraints
(14) and (44) are homogenous of degree zero in cit and ait. These jointly imply that
the optimal solution is also homothetic in cit and ait in the sense that if the value of ait is
multiplied by (1 itit), then the optimal plan for fcit0g1t0=t thereafter is also multiplied by
(1 itit). Because V 0t (a) = c =, this means that V 0t
 
(1 )a =  (1 )c = = (1 
) V 0t (a). Substituting it into (81) and then using   E[],    q^, and H  H +  q,
we obtain the arbitrage condition (45) and the risk premium function (46) in the text.
Next, dierentiating both sides of HJB equation (80) by total assets a gives the envelope
condition:
V 0t (a) =
@V 0t (a)
@t
+ V 00t (a)
n
(1  )rta+ (B   H + _wt=wt)a  c
o
+ V 0t (a)
n
(1  )rt + (B   H + _wt=wt)
o
+ (q + q^Pt)
n
E

V 0t
 
(1  )a(1  )  V 0t (a)o:
(82)
On the RHS, the sum of the rst and second terms can be written as @V 0t (a)=@t+V 00t (a) _a =
dV 0t (a)=dt = d(c =)=dt =  c  1 _c= =  ( _c=c)V 0t (a); where _c and _a are movements
in c and a when the household is not hit by a disaster. From (81), the sum of the third
and fourth terms is rtV
0
t (a) + (q + q^Pt)

E

V 0t
 
(1   )a   V 0t (a)	. Therefore, using
V 0t
 
(1  )a = (1  ) V 0t (a), the envelope condition (82) simplies to (47) in the text.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 2
From (46) and (49), the dierence between R() and S() can be written as
R()  S() =  E
h
(1  ) (1  )
i
+    + 1    Q(; ;	); (83)
where we denote the dierence by Q(; ;	) to show explicitly its dependence on parameter
 and the distribution of  (i.e., 	()), and on variable . It is easy to conrm Q(0; ;	) = 0
44
by substituting  = 0 into (83) and then using E[] =  . The rst and second derivatives
of Q(; ;	) with respect to  are
Q0(; ;	) =  E
h
(1  )  1(1  )
i
+   ; (84)
Q00(; ;	) =  ( + 1)E
h
(1  )  22(1  )
i
: (85)
By substituting  = 0 into (84), we obtain Q0(0; ;	) = E

2

> 0. In addition, because
the support of distribution 	() is  2 (0; 1) and  is between 0 and 1, (1  ) and (1  )
are always positive. Therefore, the expression in the expectation operator in (85) is always
positive, from which we obtain Q00(; ;	) < 0 for all  2 [0; 1].
Next, we show that Q(1; ;	) is negative for all  > 1. Substituting  = 1 into (83)
and then dierentiating it with respect to  gives:
Q(1; ;	) =  E
h
(1  )1 
i
+ (   1)  + 1; (86)
@Q(1; ;	)
@
= E
h
(1  )1  log(1  )
i
+  : (87)
Note that (1   )1  > 1 holds because (1   ) 2 (0; 1) and 1    < 0. In addition, we
can conrm log(1   ) <   for all  2 (0; 1) from the graph of the logarithmic function.
From these, the expression in the expectation operator in (87) is always lower than  ,
and hence the RHS of (87) is negative. In addition, (86) implies that Q(1; ;	)! 0 when
 ! 1. Thus, @Q(1; ;	)=@ < 0 means that Q(1; ;	) < 0 for all  > 1.
We have shown that the smooth function Q(; ;	) starts from origin (Q(0; ;	) = 0),
has a positive gradient at origin (Q0(0; ;	) > 0), is strictly concave for all  2 [0; 1]
(Q00(; ;	) < 0), and becomes negative when  = 1 (Q(1; ;	) < 0), as depicted in
Figure 6(iv). From these, we can conclude that the graph of function Q(; ;	) crosses the
horizontal axis exactly once in the region of  2 (0; 1); i.e., there exist unique  2 (0; 1) such
that R() S() = Q(; ;	) = 0 holds. It is also obvious that R() S() = Q(; ;	) > 0
for  2 (0; ) and R()  S() = Q(; ;	) < 0 for  2 (; 1].
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